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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In the European Union, Full Market Opening (FMO) of postal markets is now scheduled for 
January 1st, 2011 (and January 1st, 2013 for new members). FMO allows competitors of the 
incumbent postal operator to enter all the segments of the postal markets including mail 
delivery. FMO might be a threat for the financing of the Universal Service Obligation (USO) 
imposed on the incumbent postal operator, particularly if the entrant bypasses the incumbent's 
delivery network.   
 
In the postal sector, competition has started long before FMO. However, with a few 
exceptions, competition was limited to the upstream segments of the market (collection and 
sorting) through the use of worksharing agreements. Worksharing or access means that a 
competitor can perform all the upstream operations of the postal value chain and buy access to 
the incumbent's PO delivery network at a discounted price (compared to the letter price). 
FMO means that in addition to the access solution that will continue to be available, the 
competitors also have the option to deliver mail with their own delivery network (bypass).   
 
In this paper, we are interested in the consequences of FMO on the behavior of the incumbent 
PO. As mentioned, FMO means that the entrant can bypass the incumbent’s delivery network 
and build up its own.  Bypass can be detrimental for both the incumbent’s profit –with a 
negative impact on its ability to finance the USO– and welfare  (Crew and Kleindorfer 2005, 
De Donder 2006, and Bloch and Gautier 2007).  Our interest lies in the strategies that the 
incumbent can develop to prevent (inefficient) bypass by the entrant.  In particular, we 
concentrate on the pricing and on the investment strategies undertaken by the incumbent (or 
the regulator) to deter bypass.   
 
In this paper, we will consider how the incumbent’s strategies will be modified by the threat 
of bypass by the entrant. To this end, we construct a model where an incumbent PO competes 
in postal markets with a profit-maximizing entrant. The entrant chooses its letter price and the 
delivery method -access or bypass- that leads to the highest profit. As a starting point of our 
analysis, we consider the prices and investment level that apply when competition is limited 
to the upstream segments of the market.  These pre-FMO prices are either set by a welfare-
maximizing regulator or by a profit-maximizing firm.  We show that, facing the threat of 
entry, the incumbent PO may change its price structure and may also strategically invest in its 
delivery network,.  
 
By changing its prices, the incumbent can strategically deter bypass by making this option 
less profitable for the entrant. To do so, the incumbent manipulates both its letter and access 
prices.1 The two instruments affect differently the incentives to bypass. For the entrant, the 
access price is the cost of outsourcing delivery. Therefore a change in the access price 
amounts to a change in production cost. To deter bypass, the incumbent can thus lower its 
access price to make the access option relatively more profitable for the entrant.   
 
A change in the letter price changes the volume of mails carried by the entrant. The lower the 
incumbent's letter price, the lower the demand faced by the entrant. And the magnitude of this 
effect depends on the cross-price elasticity of the demands.  But this holds true under both 
access and bypass. So, how can the incumbent deter bypass by changing its letter price? 
Suppose that a given price change has the same impact on the entrant's mailing volume under 
access and bypass.  Then, the impact of a price change on its profit depends on the price cost 
margin in the two cases.  If the unit margin is highest under bypass, a price cut by the 
incumbent leads to a higher profit decrease with bypass. Therefore, decreasing the letter price 
makes the access option more attractive.  Conversely, if the unit margin is highest under 
access, the incumbent will deter bypass by increasing its letter price i.e. by reducing the 
entrant's volume.  In this paper, we show that the incumbent PO must reduce both the access 
and the delivery prices to prevent bypass.  However, constraining the entrant to choose access 
is costly in terms of foregone profit and welfare since the incumbent departs from pre-FMO 
prices, which are assumed to be efficient.  
 
Next, we introduce the possibility for the incumbent PO to increase the productivity of its 
delivery activity by restructuring it. For example it could re-organize its delivery network or 
invest to expand automated sorting. The incentives to undertake these kinds of investment 
depend on the expected gains that are obviously affected by the delivery method chosen by 
the entrant.  We can decompose the benefit of the investment into a direct and a strategic 
component. The size of the investment depends on the magnitude of these two components. 
The direct effect is linked to the mail volume processed by the incumbent.  With a larger mail 
volume, the gains from reducing by a given amount the unit delivery cost are larger. 
Therefore the direct effect is linked to number of letters delivered by the incumbent, including 
those pre-sorted by the entrant and posted at an access point.  Regarding the direct incentive 
only, the incumbent invests more under access than under bypass since the latter implies a 
(possibly drastic) reduction in the number of postal items delivered.  The strategic effect is 
linked to the impact of the investment on the competitor's behavior (see Fundenberg and 
Tirole, 1984 for a related analysis). In this context, the only change in behavior that the 
incumbent can expect from the entrant is a change of delivery method. Because of these 
strategic incentives, the incumbent PO may invest more to deter bypass. Hence, the 
investment together with its pricing decisions will be used by the incumbent to deter bypass 
by the entrant.   
 
We show that it is not when the two firms are engaged in so-called facility based competition 
that the incentive to invest are the highest. The incumbent firm has the highest incentive to 
invest when its investment can modify the delivery decision of the entrant. Hence, we will 
observe the highest investment levels for the firms that try to deter their competitor from 
engaging in facility-based competition.   
 
                                                
1 In Bloch and Gautier (2007), the entrant is competitive and chooses the cheapest option for mail delivery. 
Therefore the letter price does not influence the delivery decision and the only possible way to deter bypass is to 
make access less costly than bypass i.e. to reduce the access price. 
The paper is organized as follow: we present the basic ingredients of the model in section 2.  
We derive the post-FMO price changes in section 3.  Section 4 considers the investment 




The incumbent PO, denoted hereafter firm 1, offers two products: an E2E letter at price p1 and 
access to its delivery network at price a. The entrant, firm 2, offers only an E2E letter at price 
p2.  Consumers view the two E2E letter products as imperfect substitutes. For example, the 
entrant may have a lower frequency of collection or delivery and/or a lower geographical 
coverage.  
 
The demand for the E2E letter offered by firm i=1,2 is denoted xi(p1,p2).  These demand 
functions have the standard properties. The entrant has two options for mail delivery. It can 
either buy access at unit-price a or it can set-up its own delivery network. In case it chooses 
the access option, the demand for access is x2(p1,p2). In case it chooses to bypass, there is no 
demand for access and the incumbent sells only an E2E letter to consumers. This means that 
consumer direct access is not considered in this model. 
 
We decompose the postal value chain in two composite activities: upstream activities 
(collection, transport, sorting) and delivery (distribution). The constant unit cost of all the 
upstream activities is denoted by ci for firm i. Delivery involves two types of cost: a fixed cost 
and a constant per-unit cost. The fixed costs are denoted by F1 and F2, the per-unit cost d1 and 
d2. The entrant can avoid these delivery costs, if it chooses to buy access from the incumbent. 
In addition, universal service obligations imposed on the incumbent operator involves a fixed 
cost F.  
 
Firms compete in prices. We suppose that the incumbent is price leader. This means that the 
entrant decides on its price p2 and on its delivery method after observing the letter and the 
access prices set by the incumbent. The entrant chooses the price and the delivery option that 
maximize its profits.2 The prices of the incumbent are either set by the firm in order to 
maximize its profits or by a postal regulator that seeks to maximize welfare.   
 
In the regulated case, the regulator can decentralize the welfare maximizing prices by 
imposing a global price cap on the incumbent (Billette de Villemeur et al., 2003).  The main 
difference between regulated and un-regulated prices is the price levels and not the price 
structure.  From now on, we adopt the convention that the incumbent and not the regulator 
sets the prices in order to maximize its profit (in the absence of a price cap) or to maximize 




3.1 Pre-FMO pricing 
 
                                                
2 Other models of the mail sector typically assume that the entrant behaves as a competitive fringe and sets its 
price at marginal cost. This assumption of competitive fringe seems extreme. We consider here another extreme 
assumption – von Stackelberg leadership– where the entrant chooses its follower price in order to maximize 
profits. The reality of competition between the PO and the entrant lies probably somewhere between these two 
extreme assumptions. 
 
Consider the pre-FMO situation where the entrant does not have the possibility to bypass the 
incumbent’s delivery network.  The game played by the incumbent and the entrant is a two-
stage game. At a first stage, the incumbent sets its retail (stamp) price  and its access price 
. At a second stage, after observing these prices, the entrant sets its retail (stamp) price 
.    
 
In this paper, we leave aside the exact description of the optimal prices.  This work has been 
done elsewhere by Laffont and Tirole (1994) or Crew and Kleindorfer (1992), Bloch and 
Gautier (2007) and Billette de Villemeur et al. (2007) for the postal sector.  For our argument, 
it is sufficient to consider the maximization problems faced by the two firms.3 The entrant 
chooses its price . 
We let ZA denote the objective of the incumbent, where ZA equals profit in the absence of a 
price-cap and welfare otherwise.    The optimal prices  and  are the solutions of: 
 
 
In particular, we note that the incumbent chooses its stamp and access prices taking into 
account their effects on the optimal choice of the entrant. 
 
3.2 Post FMO pricing 
 
FMO means that the entrant has the possibility of bypassing the incumbent’s delivery 
network.  Under FMO, the game played by the incumbent and the entrant becomes a three-
stage game.  First, as before, the incumbent sets its prices.  Second, the entrant decides on its 
delivery method -access or bypass-. And, third, the entrant sets its retail price.   
Consider the last stage of this game. In case of access, the entrant chooses the price .  In 
case of bypass, its optimal price is found by solving 
 
 
The optimal delivery choice of the entrant at the second stage of the game is easily found. If 
the entrant will choose to bypass. If  it will choose access, and if 
, it will be indifferent between the two delivery methods. Obviously, the parameters 
of the delivery function of the entrant only affect profit under bypass. Hence, comparing the 
profit levels in the two cases, we can easily establish the following: 
  
Proposition 1: At any prices , there exists a cut-off level for the entrant’s marginal 
delivery cost  such that (1) the entrant prefers bypass for  and access otherwise, (2) 
 and (3) the value of  decreases with the fixed cost F2.   
 
                                                
3 We will assume that the second order conditions hold for all maximization problems, namely that the entrant’s 
profit, is concave in  and the incumbent’s objective, ZA is concave in a and p1. 
PROOF: At given prices , the profit decreases in d2.  The profit  is independent 
of d2.  Therefore, there exist a level  such that . 
For d2= , .  Hence,  is clearly smaller that the access price level. ■ 
 
In a liberalized market, the entrant has two available technologies for mail delivery: a constant 
return to scale one -access- available at price  and an increasing return to scale one -bypass- 
characterized by a fixed cost F2 and a constant unit cost d2.4  Because of the fixed cost, the 
entrant does not choose the technology with the lowest marginal cost.  That is for , 
the marginal delivery cost is lower under bypass but, because of the fixed cost, the highest 
profit is achieved if the entrant buys access.  
 
Proposition 1 clarifies the conditions on the parameters of the model under which access or 
bypass is likely to occur. We now return to the first stage of the model, keeping the delivery 
costs d2  and F2 fixed, and computing the optimal choice of the incumbent. 
 
 3.3 Access, bypass and constrained access 
 
Formally, our model is similar to the classical model of entry barriers, where the incumbent 
chooses a price in order to block, deter or accommodate entry of a competitor (Tirole (1988), 
Chapter 8). The model differs from the classical model in two respects: (i) the choice of the 
entrant is not whether to enter or not, but whether to bypass or use the delivery technology of 
the incumbent, and (ii) accordingly, the incumbent chooses two instruments rather than one, 
namely both an access price a and a delivery price p1. 
 
By analogy with the model of entry barriers, we can distinguish three regimes: 
 
Access (blocked bypass): By setting its optimal delivery and access prices, the incumbent 
prevents bypass. 
 
Constrained access (deterred bypass): The incumbent distorts its delivery and access prices 
in order to force the entrant to choose access. 
 
Bypass (accommodated bypass): The incumbent prefers to let the entrant set up its own 
delivery network, and chooses its optimal prices anticipating bypass. 
 
As in the model of entry barriers, some remarks are in order. First, the choice of the 
incumbent depends crucially on the ‘entry’ (F2) and delivery (d2) costs of the entrant. The 
higher these costs, the less likely the entrant is to choose bypass. Hence, when entry and 
delivery costs are high enough, bypass is always blocked. When they are very low, the 
incumbent prefers to accommodate bypass, and chooses its optimal prices accordingly. 
Constrained access appears only for intermediate values of the entry and delivery costs. 
Second, the analysis is conducted under the assumption that the incumbent can commit to its 
access and delivery prices. Absent this commitment, the incumbent would be unable to 
influence the entrant’s decision, and the analysis would be markedly different: the incumbent 
and entrant would both choose Bertrand equilibrium prices.  
                                                
4 In Bloch and Gautier (2007), we assumed F2 to be zero.  In this case, the entrant can choose between two 
constant returns to scale technologies for mail delivery.  Clearly, it chooses the cheapest one: access for d2≥a and 
bypass otherwise. 
 
 3.4 Constrained access 
 
We now focus attention on the regime of strategic bypass deterrence, when the incumbent 
chooses its delivery and access prices in order to force the entrant to choose access.  To do 
that, the incumbent must ensure that the following constraint is satisfied.  
 (1) 
This equation shows that the incumbent can use either of his two instruments (access or 
delivery price) to prevent bypass. Clearly, at the optimal delivery price, the incumbent needs 
to reduce its access price (with respect to the optimal access price) in order to deter bypass. 
Similarly, at the optimal access price (which satisfies > , since the entrant prefers bypass 
at the optimal pre-FMO prices), the incumbent needs to reduce the delivery price, in order to 
lower mail volume thereby reducing the mail volume of the entrant, and the relative 
advantage of bypass over access. 
 
The previous heuristic argument shows that, if the incumbent sets either instrument at the 
optimal pre-FMO level, it will necessarily choose to lower the other price with respect to the 
optimal pre-FMO level. Hence, one expects that, in the constrained access regime, the full 
opening of the postal markets will induce a decrease in the delivery price of the PO or the 
access price charged to the entrant. What if the incumbent can now independently vary the 
two prices? 
 
Formally, the optimal delivery and access prices in the constrained access regime will be 
chosen by the incumbent in order to maximize its objective function ZA subject to the 
constrained access constraint (1). If we denote by  the Lagrange multiplier of this 
constraint, the first-order conditions of the profit/welfare maximization problem read as 
follows: 
 
Let and be the solutions to this problem.  We can establish the following:  
 
Proposition 2: To deter bypass, (1) the access price must be lowered and (2) the 
incumbent's letter price must be decreased . 
PROOF: If at prices , the constraint (1) is slack,  and bypass can be prevented 
with the pre-FMO prices (blocked bypass case). Otherwise if the prices  induce bypass, 
prices must be changed and (1) is binding ( ).    
(1) The term  is negative. Hence, when the 
constraint is binding , the access price is below its optimal level .  
(2) If , we have  (see proposition 1).  This implies that the term 
 is negative.  Hence, 
when , the price  must be lower than .  ■   
 
Hence, in general, in order to prevent bypass, both the delivery and access prices will be 
adjusted downwards. The access price is reduced to increase the margin of the entrant and 
make access more attractive. The delivery price is lowered in order to reduce the mail volume 
carried by the entrant, again making bypass less attractive. 
 
We now analyze how changes in the delivery and entry cost of the entrant affect the optimal 
value of the incumbent’s objective.  
 
Proposition 3: In the constrained access regime, when the costs of the entrant, F2 and d2, 
increase, the optimal value of the incumbent’s objective increases. Furthermore, either the 
delivery or the access price of the incumbent must go up.  
 
PROOF: The second part of the Proposition is easily proved, by looking at constraint (1). If 
F2 increases and a and p1 both decrease, the difference between access and bypass must 
strictly increase – contradicting the equality of constraint (1).  Similarly, when the delivery 
cost d2 increases, one of the two optimal prices of the incumbent prices must go up.  This 
holds true as long as (1) is binding.  Prices will increase with the cost of the entrant up to their 
pre-FMO level.  Once they reach that level, the constraint (1) is slack and we switch from the 
constrained access case to the access (blocked bypass case).   
 For the first part of the proposition, notice that an increase in the entry or delivery 
costs relaxes constraint (1): any pair of prices ( , ) which was feasible under the old 
parameter values will remain feasible under the new values. Hence, the objective of the 
incumbent can never decrease, and will in fact generally increase, as the set of prices for 
which bypass is dominated by access will be strictly enlarged when F2 and d2 increase. ■ 
 
We thus conclude that the objective of the incumbent under the constrained access regime is a 
strictly increasing function of the delivery and entry costs of the entrant. When these values 
are high enough to guarantee that the entrant prefers to access the incumbent’s network, 
blocked bypass is obtained. Furthermore, as in the classical model of barriers to entry, bypass 
deterrence will become more and more costly as the entry and delivery costs of the entrant go 
down. For low values of F2 and d2, the PO will prefer to accommodate bypass and let the 
entrant build its own delivery network.  
 
 4. INVESTMENT  
 
In this section, we introduce the possibility for the incumbent firm to invest in a cost-reducing 
delivery technology before it fixes its prices. Consider that, before fixing its prices, the 
incumbent can undertake a costly investment that reduces its unit delivery cost d1. Precisely, 
we consider that by investing an amount φ(e), the incumbent PO reduces its marginal delivery 
cost by an amount e. The function φ(e) is increasing and convex in e and the incumbent 
decides on the investment size e.  
 
Increasing the productivity of the delivery network is a key challenge for postal operators in 
the perspective of FMO.5  The recent PWC report (2006) recognizes that there is a significant 
                                                
5 Increasing the productivity of the incumbent PO is a way to finance (at least partially) the USO in a 
competitive postal market.  Cremer et al. (2002) is an early model showing the relationship between productivity 
improvements and for the ability of the incumbent to meet its universal service obligations after FMO.    
 
potential for productivity growth in European PO and list some initiatives that can be put in 
place in order to increase efficiency (page 62).  Among those, the followings recover the 
above idea of investments that reduce the variable cost of delivery:  sorting automation and/or 
rationalization of transport and sorting networks, centralized sorting centers, walk sequencing 
and/or walk route optimization.  The size of these investments can be considerable; For 
example, the Austrian Post invested 200 million euros in the reduction (from 39 to 6) and the 
automation of its sorting centers.    
 
If the competitor chooses access, the profit of the incumbent is equal to 
 and if the competitor chooses to 
bypass profit is .  Let  be the value of the profit of 
firm 1 under access (k=A) and bypass (k=B) evaluated at the optimal prices.  In the absence 
of a price cap, the investment level is determined by maximizing - φ(e) with respect to e.    
In the accommodated and blocked bypass cases, the optimal value of e is found by solving: 
∂( - φ(e))/∂e=0. Taking the total derivative with respect to e and using the envelope 
theorem, the optimal investment level in the access and bypass cases are:  
 If the entrant chooses access 
 If the entrant bypasses 
 
This means that in the situations in which the incumbent accommodates bypass or access, the 
optimal investment size is directly linked to the volume of mail processed, including the mail 
of the competitors that are pre-sorted and posted at an access point.   So mail volume is a key 
determinant of investment.  The larger the volume, the higher the profit increase for a given 
reduction in the per-unit delivery cost.  We will refer to direct incentives as the investment 
incentives linked to the mail volume.    
 
Given the observed price elasticities and displacement ratios in the postal sector, it is likely 
that the investment level would be higher when the entrant chooses the access option than 
when it chooses to bypass since in the latter case, the incumbent looses the volume x2 which 
reduces the incentives for investment.  
 
Next, consider the situations where after FMO, the incumbent blocks bypass. In the 
constrained access region, the incumbent will manipulate its delivery and access prices to 
prevent bypass. This distortion will clearly affect the incentives to invest in a technology to 
reduce delivery cost. In fact, we now have the following. The derivative of , 
evaluated at the optimal prices ( ),  with respect to e writes as follows:  
 
Given the constraint (1) faced by the incumbent, the derivatives and 
are no longer equal to zero. In fact, applying the same reasoning as above, 
we can easily show that these derivatives are strictly positive (see proposition 2). Hence, there 
are two additional terms which increase the level of investment in the constrained access case. 
We will refer to these additional terms as the strategic incentives for investment.   
 
In the constrained access case, there is still a direct incentive for investment which is linked to 
the mail volume.  But, there is in addition a strategic incentive.  It captures the impact of the 
investment on the induced behavior of the entrant. The strategic incentives capture the impact 
of decreasing d1 on the distortions in prices that the incumbent applies to deter bypass. 
 
To understand this, notice that in order to prevent bypass, the incumbent reduces its access 
price a. If the incumbent reduces its delivery cost d1, then the optimal pre-FMO access price 
also decreases. Hence, investing in the delivery network reduces the optimal access price and 
thus constitutes an alternative way to prevent bypass.6  The incumbent also changes its letter 
price in the constrained access region. We know that a lower delivery cost implies a lower 
delivery price p1. Hence, as it is optimal to reduce delivery price to deter bypass, investing in 
a delivery network makes the letter price reduction less costly. It therefore fosters the 
investment incentives.  
 
On the other hand, if the incumbent chooses to accommodate bypass, incentives to invest 
decline sharply, because the incumbent now only faces a direct effect on its own mail volume, 
x1. Hence, we expect to observe an abrupt, discontinuous, decrease in the level of investment 
when the entry and delivery costs of the entrant are so low as to prevent the incumbent from 
deterring bypass. But this also shows that the incumbent can use investments in productivity 
gains in order to affect the delivery regimes. When delivery costs d1 go down, the 
incumbent’s incentives to maintain access and prevent bypass increase, so that the incumbent 
may have an extra incentive to invest, in order to switch from a regime of accommodated 
bypass to a regime of constrained access. 
 
If a price cap is imposed on the incumbent PO, the investment will depend on the same 
components -strategic and direct- incentives.  However, the investment level will not be the 
same since the mail volume is changed when a price cap is imposed.  In general, a 
quantitative analysis of the investment levels for a welfare-maximizing (or price-cap 
constrained) firm requires a detailed analysis of the demand functions.  This is beyond the 
scope of this paper.     
 
Up to now, we only considered investments that reduce the marginal cost of delivery.  
Investments that aim at reducing the fixed cost of delivery and/or the financial burden of the 
USO would also prove useful to deter bypass.  Decreasing the scope of the USO and the 
associated cost would do the same.7  If the incumbent reduces its fixed costs, it can charge a 
lower mark-up over its costs to break-even.  Hence, these types of investment contribute to 
reduce the price p1 and a, and therefore they are also useful to prevent inefficient bypass.   
 
 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper, we have shown that the incumbent PO may strategically deter bypass by 
modifying its price structure. By changing the access price, it manages to influence the cost of 
the entrant and by changing its letter price, it manages to modify the mail volume carried by 
the entrant. And, both the mail volume and the cost determine the decision to bypass or not.  
We also consider the possibility for the incumbent of engaging in a costly restructuring of its 
delivery activity. We identify the incentives to undertake such an investment and we show 
                                                
6 Preventing bypass by changing the price requires that the incumbent PO is able to commit on its price.  There is 
no problem of this kind for the investment.   
7 Crew and Kleindorfer (2006) show that reducing the scope of the USO (reducing counter density) is optimal 
under FMO for a regulator that wants to avoid subsidies.    
that they are directly related to the mail volume distributed by the incumbent. Hence, it is 
when the entrant remains a monopolist in the delivery activity that the direct incentives are the 
strongest. 
 
There is also a strategic motive for investment. In regions of the parameters for which the 
incumbent optimally deters bypass, a reduction of the delivery cost reduces the price 
distortion between the optimal price of the incumbent and its actual price. Hence, investing ex 
ante in a cost reducing investment makes it cheaper for the incumbent to deter bypass. This 
suggests that the incentives to invest in cost-reducing technologies may not be highest when 
the incumbent and the entrant are engaged in facility-based competition (accommodated 
bypass), but when the incumbent strategically distorts its delivery and access prices in order to 
deter bypass (deterred bypass). Hence, PO may be compelled to invest massively in cost-
reducing technologies before FMO, in order to induce their competitors to choose access over 
bypass. In order to better understand the strategic effects of cost-reducing investments, it 
would be necessary to study in detail the actual patterns of investment by postal operators in 
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